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Nancy J. Moore
Abstract
Some physicians are receiving financial incentives for enrolling their patients in clinical studies,
while others have financial interests in companies that will profit from the products under
investigation. These practices are arguable permissible under both applicable law and codes of
medical ethics. Further, physicians are not required even to disclose their financial conflicts
when advising patients to enroll in a clinical experiment. This article explores differences
between the medical and legal professions’ treatments of conflicts of interest in order to explain
1) why physicians have failed to adequately address conflicts not only in clinical research, but
also in other aspects of medical practice, and 2) how these conflicts should be addressed. The
article concludes that physicians do not fail to recognize that there may be conflicts between
their financial interests and the interests of their patients, but rather that the typical physician’s
response is that conflicts of interest are pervasive in medical practice and it is the ethical duty of
physicians to resist temptation. Under such a broad definition of conflicts of interest, it is not
surprising that physicians resist required disclosures or other precautionary measures. Lawyers,
however, do not typically define “conflicts of interest” as broadly as physicians, but rather
confine “conflict-of-interest doctrine” to circumstances that are unique to specific lawyers. The
article further concludes that many (but not all) of the types of conflicts currently facing clinical
researchers are proper subjects for regulation by conflict-of-interest doctrine. Applying this
doctrine, it is clear that most cases will involve conflicts of interest that, at a minimum, must be
disclosed to the patient. At least some conflicts, however, should be deemed nonconsentable,
such as the receipt of financial incentives for enrolling patients in clinical studies, given the lack
of benefits of permitting such payments, either to society at large or to patients themselves.

“What Doctors Can Learn From Lawyers About Conflict-of-Interest Doctrine”
By Nancy J. Moore
Professor of Law
Boston University School of Law
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Some physicians receive financial incentives for enrolling their patients in clinical
studies; 1 others have financial interests in companies that will profit from the products under
investigation.2 Not only are these (and other) practices arguably permissible under both
applicable law3 and codes of medical ethics,4 but physicians are not even required to disclose
1

Frances H. Miller, “Trusting Doctors: Tricky Business When It Comes to Clinical Research,” [cite,
manuscript at 3, n. 12] (hereinafter “Trusting Doctors”). See also, Mark Barnes and Sara Krauss, “Conflicts of
Interest in Human Research: Risks and Pitfalls of ‘Easy Money’ in Research Funding,” 9 BNA Health Law Reporter
at [p. 6 of Westlaw citation 9BHLR 1378] (“Among the most criticized research compensation practices has been
the payment by research sponsors of per patient “enrollment bonuses” to physicians.”).
2

Miller, “Trusting Doctors,” supra note 1 at [manuscript at 16, n. 68]. See also Barnes and Krauss, supra
note 1, at [p. 2 of Westlaw printout] (“Also of significant concern is that physician-researchers and/or host
institutions may take ‘stakes’—such as stock options or equity ownership—in the companies whose drugs, devices,
or gene therapy products are being tested by those physicians and/or those hospitals.”)
3

There are no federal laws that forbid physicians from having ownership interests in products under
investigation or in companies owning such products. See Barnes and Krauss, supra note 1, at [pp. 3] (stating that the
most restrictive federal regulation of financial conflicts of interest merely proposes certain financial disclosure
obligations on organizations and their researchers). I am unaware of any state laws to the contrary. Enrollment
incentives might violate the federal Anti-Kickback Law, i.e., if they are intended to induce physicians to purchase
drugs or services to be paid for by Medicaid or Medicare, but not if they “are at all related to the value of research
services performed.” Id. at [p. 6]. Typically, there are actual costs associated with the research, and it may be
difficult to separate actual costs from any added “incentive payment.” See, e.g., Recruiting Human Subjects:
Pressures in Industry-Sponsored Clinical Research, Office of the [DHHS] Inspector General (June 200) OEI-01-9700195, at 17 (hereinafter “Recruiting Human Subjects”).
4

The American Medical Association’s Principles of Medical Ethics do not address conflicts of interest,
either in practice or in research. See AMA, Principles of Medical Ethics, in Rena A. Gorlin, Codes of Professional
Responsibility 341 (4th ed.1999). There are two advisory opinions of the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs that generally address a physician’s ethical responsibilities in clinical research. One opinion sets forth
comprehensive guidelines for physicians engaging in clinical investigation of new drugs and procedures; it does not
mention conflicts of interest, financial or otherwise. Opinion 2.07, Current Opinions of the Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs, in Gorlin, supra, at 350. The other opinion specifically addresses conflicts of interest in biomedical
research; rather than providing guidelines directly for physicians, however, it simply states that “[a]ll medical centers
should develop specific guidelines for their clinical staff on conflicts of interest,” and further, that these guidelines
should include a rule that “once a clinical investigator becomes involved in a research project for a company or
knows that he or she might become involved, she or he, as an individual cannot ethically buy or sell the company’s
stock until the involvement ends and the results of the research are published or otherwise disseminated to the
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their financial conflicts when advising patients to enroll in a clinical experiment.5 Indeed, a
recent essay discussing the basic requirements for ethical research fails to even mention the risks
of harm to patients that are presented by conflicts of interest on the part of a clinical researcher. 6
Professor Miller understandably characterizes as a “startling omission” the medical
profession’s failure to address conflicts of interest between clinical researchers and their
patients.7 As one who has previously studied the differences between the medical and legal
professions’ treatments of conflicts of interest,8 I am not nearly as startled as Professional Miller.
After all, unlike the legal profession, the medical profession lacks a strong tradition of regulating

public.” Opinion 8.031, Current Opinions of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, in Gorline, supra, at 389.
Although the rationale for the suggested guideline is not given, I assume that the intent is to prohibit illegal insider
trading. Thus, the suggested guidelines do not prohibit physicians from having financial ties to companies whose
products they are investigating; rather, they merely require that such ties be disclosed to the medical center where the
research is conducted. Id. The suggested guidelines also require that “any remuneration received by the researcher
from the company whose product is being studied must be commensurate with the efforts of the researcher on behalf
of the company,” id.; this guideline does not clearly prohibit incentive payments, as it appears to permit
compensation for more than the actual costs of a physician’s participation in a clinical study.
One medical association recently adopted a flat ban on physicians from having ownership interests in
companies whose products they are testing, but this position is clearly the exception and not the rule. See infra note [
] & accompanying text.
5
As Professor Miller notes, federal law requires only that physicians disclose financial conflicts to the
institution sponsoring the study; it does not require disclosure to the subjects of the investigation. See Miller,
“Trusting Doctors,” supra note 1 at [12/20 manuscript at 19]. See also note 4, supra (discussing AMA advisory
opinion suggesting similar guidelines for institutions sponsoring clinical research). But see Moore v. Regents of the
University of California, 51 Cal 3d 120, 793 P. 2d 479 (1990), a common law breach of fiduciary duty case
discussed by Professor Miller. See Miller, “Tricky Business,” supra note 1 at [12/20 manuscript at 19]
6

Ezekiel Emanuel, David Wendler and Christine Grady, “What Makes Clinical Research Ethical,” 283 J.
Am. Med. Ass’n 2701 (2000), discussed in Miller, “Trusting Doctors,” supra note 1 at [12/20 manuscript at 15].
7

Miller, “Trusting Doctors” supra note 1 at [12/20 manuscript at 16].

8
See Nancy J. Moore, “Entrepreneurial Doctors and Lawyers: Regulating Business Activities in the Medical
and Legal professions,” in Roy G. Spece, Jr., David S. Shimm, Allen E. Buchanan, eds., Conflicts of Interest in
Clinical Practice & Research 171 (1996) (hereinafter “Moore, “Doctors and Lawyers”). I have also compared the
medical and legal professions’ treatments of confidentiality. See Nancy J. Moore, “Limits to Attorney-Client
Confidentiality: A ‘Philosophically Informed’ and Comparative Approach to Legal and Medical Ethics,” 36 Case
Western Reserve Law Review177 (1985-86) (hereinafter “Attorney-Client Confidentiality”).
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conflicts of interest in medical practice generally.9 Indeed, the AMA Principles of Medical
Ethics make no mention of the subject;10 nor is it typically addressed in standard treatises and
casebooks on medical ethics.11
Both doctors and lawyers believe that trust is essential to the success of the professional
relationship.12 Why then have physicians failed to adequately address conflicts not only in
clinical research, but also in other aspects of medical practice? And if physicians (or others)13
were to address these conflicts, would the practices in question be prohibited altogether or would
it be sufficient for physicians to proceed with the informed consent of their patients? The
purpose of my brief response to Professor Miller’s provocative article is to suggest possible
answers to these questions, based on a comparison between the medical and legal professions’

9

Moore, “Doctors and Lawyers,” supra note 8 at 179.

10

Id. As note earlier, there are several advisory opinions of the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs
that address conflicts of interest in clinical research. See supra note [4]. See also infra notes [ ] & accompanying text.
In addition, a section of the AMA Code of Medical Ethics entitled “Fundamental Elements of Patient-Physician
Relationsip,” that contains a statement that patients are entitled “to be advised of potential conflicts of interest that
their physicians might have.” Gorlin, supra note [ ], at 341-342. This section was adopted by the AMA in 1990. I
have been unable to locate any opinions of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs addressing this proposition.
11

See, e.g., Barry Furrow, et al. Health Law (2d ed. 2000) (containing no entry for conflicts of interest in
index nor any discussion of physician conflicts in the chapter on research); Robert M. Veatch, A Theory of Medical
Ethics (1981) (containing no entry for conflicts of interest in index). But see Arthur L. France, Bioethics: Health
Care, Human Rights, and the Law (1999) (containing brief section on conflicts of interest in medical research,
limited to discussion of common law breach of fiduciary duty set forth in Moore; additional reference in index to
conflicts of interest refers generally to disclosure obligations of physicians); Terrance C. McConnell, Moral Issues in
Health Care: An Introduction to Medical Ethics 4-44 (1982) (containing no entry for conflicts of interest in index,
but does have a section entitled “Confidentiality and Conflicting Loyalties,” including a case study raising what
lawyers would view as a classic conflict of interests between two patients).
12

See, e.g., Miller, “Trusting Doctors,” supra note 1, at [12/20 manuscript at 5-7 (discussing role of
“trusting” in physician-patient relationship; Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 146 (1986) (discussing role
of trust in attorney-client relationship).
13

For a discussion of the extent to which the medical profession is regulated by legislative and
administrative bodies, in addition to self-regulation through medical codes, see Moore, “Doctors and Lawyers,”
supra note [ ] at 181-184. The legal profession has been granted far more ability to regulate itself than has the
medical profession. Id.
January 9, 2001
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historical responses to conflicts of interest in professional practice.

Physician Failure to Address These Conflicts

According to Professor Miller, “[m]any clinicians bridle at the notion that doctors are
easily tempted to be ‘unethical’ when their self-interest is directly involved.”14 Additionally, they
“resist precautionary measures that they believe unfairly taint the whole profession for the
misdeeds of a few.”15 To lawyers like Professor Miller and me, such thinking on the part of
physicians reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the underlying purpose of both fiduciary
law16 and conflict of interest rules, such as those adopted by courts for the legal profession.17
These legal regulations are designed to hold fiduciaries to a higher standard of conduct than non-

14

Miller, “Trusting Doctors,” supra note 1, at [12/20 manuscript at 10] (citing “Conflict of interest: the new
McCarthyism in Science,” 269 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 2782)(1993).
15

Id. Physicians responded similarly to a proposal to ban referrals of patients to health care facilities in
which the physicians have an economic interest. See Moore, “Doctors and Lawyers”, supra note [ ] at 178-179:
“Thus, physicians who voted to reverse their original vote banning self-referrals
apparently did so because they were angered by the implication that they could
not be trusted to act professionally in caring for their patients. These physicians
understand that it is unethical to recommend unnecessary procedures or to refer
patients to inappropriate facilities; however, they ‘object to the implication that
every physician that [sic] is involved in some kind of facilities is guilty of a
violation of ethics.’” (Footnotes omitted.)
16

As Professor Miller notes, although it is generally believed that physicians owe fiduciary duties to their
patients, there is some question whether fiduciary law applies to the same extent to physicians as it does to other
fiduciaries. Miller, “Trusting Doctors,” supra note 1, at [12/20 manuscript at note 24 & accompanying text. Professor
Miller has been a strong proponent of applying a stricter application of fiduciary principles to physician behavior.
See, e.g., Frances H. Miller, “Secondary Income From Recommended Treatment: Should Fiduciary Principles
Constrain Physician Behavior?”, in Bradford H. Gray, ed., The New Health Care for Profit 153 (1983).
17

See, e.g., American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 1.7-1.12 (2000). See
generally, Wolfram, supra note [ ], at 312-494.
January 9, 2001
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fiduciaries in order to preserve the trust that is the hallmark of the fiduciary relationship.18
Nevertheless, given physicians’ historical attitudes toward both ethics in general and conflict of
interest problems in particular, such thinking is not at all surprising.
Unlike rule-oriented lawyers, physicians traditionally have viewed the subject of
professional ethics as a matter of “individual conscience,”19 that is, a “subject over which well
intentioned individuals can, and often do, disagree.” 20 Beginning with the Hippocratic oath,
medical codes have emphasized the “‘discretion’” of the individual physician to decide what
conduct is ethically required in particular cases,21 as well as the status of codes as providing not
rules, but rather standards of conduct,22 or perhaps merely guidance23 or a basis for moral
reasoning.24 As a result, even with respect to confidentiality---a subject directly addressed by the

18

See generally Tamar Frankel, “Fiduciary Law,” 71 Calif. L. Rev. 795 (1983) (providing a comprehensive
discussion of the underlying justifications of fiduciary law); Wolfram, supra note [ ], at 313-314 (discussing the
underlying justifications of lawyer conflict of interest rules).
Other papers in this conference have questioned both the necessity and the desirability of using fiduciary
law for these purposes. I take no position here on that extraordinarily interesting issue. For purposes of this paper, I
take as a given the application of the traditional fiduciary model to physician-patient and attorney-client
relationships.
19

Moore, “Attorney-Client Confidentiality,” supra note [8], at 183.

20

Marc A. Rodwin, “The Organized American Medical Profession’s Response to Financial Conflicts of
Interest: 1890-1992,” 70 Milbank Quarterly 703,705 (1992)(discussing physician view of conflicts of interest “as
matters of personal ethics”)..
21

Moore, “Attorney-Client Confidentiality,” supra note [8], at 183.

22

Id. (citing AMA reaffirmance of status of Principles of Medical Ethics”not as ‘laws, but standards of
conduct which define the essentials of honorable behavior for the physician’”).
23
Id. (citing “the rider habitually attached by the British Medical Association when giving ‘advice’ to its
members [that] explicitly states that it is open to the doctor to act in accordance with the dictates of his conscience”).
24

Cf. Nancy J. Moore, “The Usefulness of Ethical Codes,” 1989 Annual Survey of American Law 7, 12
(discussing the views of philosopher John Ladd, who views ethics as “‘an open-ended, reflective and critical
intellectual activity,’ one which cannot be captured in the promulgation of even voluntary rules, guidelines or
standards”).
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AMA Principles25--- physicians have failed to formulate relatively specific standards, for
example, to determine when it is permissible to disclose information to protect the welfare of
others.26
Although conflicts of interest are not addressed in the AMA Principles, a current opinion
of the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs provides as follows:
Under no circumstances may physicians place their own financial
interests above the welfare of their patients. The primary objective
of the medical profession is to render service to humanity; reward
or financial gain is a subordinate consideration. For a physician
unnecessarily to hospitalize a patient, prescribe a drug, or conduct
diagnostic tests for the physician’s financial benefit is unethical.27
It is not the case then that physicians simply fail to recognize that there may be conflicts of
interest between their financial interests and the interests of their patients. Rather, the typical
physician’s response is that conflicts of interest are pervasive in medical practice and that it is
the ethical duty of physicians (and other professionals) to resist temptation.28 Thus, in an article
cited by Professor Miller, a physician objects to medical journals requiring disclosure of
conflicts of medical researchers because conflict of interest is “a nearly universal
circumstance.29” Indeed, it includes the interest of both government and academic scientists “in
obtaining provocative results, since publicity and prominent publication may bring the rewards
25

AMA Principles of Medical Ethics, Principle IV, in Gorlin, supra note [ ], at 341.

26

Moore, “Attorney-Client Confidentiality,” supra note [ ], at 186.

27

AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs,” Opinion 8.03, in Gorlin, supra note [ ], at 388.

28
This is also the view of at least one philosopher of medical ethics, who believes that one solution to
conflict of interest problems is to better reduce physicians’ inclinations to give in to temptation. See Edmund L.
Erde, “Conflicts of Interests in Medicine: A Philosophical and Ethical Morphology,” in Spece et al., supra note [8],
at 12, 29.
29

“Conflict of Interest: The New McCarthyism in Science,” 269 J.A.M.A. 2782 (1993), in Miller, “Trusting
Doctors,” supra note 1 at [12/20 manuscript at n. 48].
January 9, 2001
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of promotion and further research funding.”30
Given such a broad definition of “conflict of interest”,31 it is not surprising that
physicians resist either required disclosures or other “precautionary measures.” After all,
conflicts of interest in this broad sense may be the “central problem” of professions, perhaps
even their “defining characteristic.”32 And if, “[b]y definition, the function of a professional is to
serve interests beyond the professional’s own self-interest,”33 then any attempt to regulate all
such conflicts does indeed appear to be a daunting, nigh impossible task.
But lawyers do not typically define “conflicts of interest” so broadly. Of course, lawyers
understand that there is pervasive conflict between the interest of lawyers and their clients and
that with respect to most of these conflicts, there is little to be done other than to rely on lawyers’
professionalism, that is, their willingness to exercise self-restraint.34 But for lawyers, there is a
difference between conflicts of interest in this broad sense and conflicts of interest in the
narrower sense reflected in both fiduciary law and ethics codes. What I will call “conflict-ofinterest doctrine” does not purport to regulate circumstances that are common to all lawyers, but
only those circumstances that may be unique to specific lawyers. In other words, conflict-ofinterest doctrine in law does not address the largely unavoidable conflicts, but only those that

30

Id. at 2783.

31

See also Erde, supra note [28] at 30 (“to have a conflict of interest is to be in a situation in which one
might plausibly be thought to do something immoral due to a motivation that might tempt most role holders or this
individual”).
32

Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., “Conflicts of Interest in the Classic Professions,” in Schimm et al., supra note

[8], at 85.
33

Id.

34

Cf. id.
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can be avoided or removed, by permitting (or requiring) clients to seek other lawyers---that is,
lawyers who are not burdened with a particular conflict of interest.35
Why lawyers, and not physicians, have developed this narrower conflict-of-interest
doctrine is at least partly a function of the frequency with which these types of conflicts arise in
legal, but not medical practice.36 Certainly lawyers confront far more conflicts between multiple
clients, including not only current, but also successive clients.37 Moreover, it has not been until
fairly recently that physicians have acquired a wide variety of particular financial interests that
conflict with the health of their patients.38 Lacking a strong historical experience of such
conflicts, physicians have been ill-equipped to distinguish between those conflicts that are
pervasive in medical practice and those that are not.

Regulation of Conflicts in Clinical Research

As noted above, some types of conflicts are largely unavoidable for medical researchers;
for example, conflicts that arise from the researcher’s interest in career advancement through

35

Cf. Michael D. Bayles, Professional Ethics 78-79 (1983) (distinguishing between “largely unavoidable
conflict[s]”, such as those between a professional’s interest in income and leisure and a client’s interest in services,
and conflicts of interest “with respect to specific professionals, clients and problems,” which “can usually be avoided
or removed”).
36

In addition, lawyers are understandably more aware of the lawyer’s role as fiduciary and the significance
of conflict-of-interest doctrine in fiduciary law.
37

See, e.g., Bayles, supra note [ ] at 81 (“Physicians do not have as many conflicts of interest between
clients as lawyers, because the health of one does not ordinarily adversely affect the health of others.”)
38

See, e.g., Arnold Relman, “The New Medical-Industrial Complex, 303 N.Eng. J. Med. 963 (1980). But
see Rodwin, supra note [20] at 704 (noting medical profession’s long history of conflicts of interest involving “feesplitting, physician’s dispensing of drugs they prescribe, and other self-referral practices”).
January 9, 2001
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provocative results.39 For these conflicts, we must indeed rely on the professionalism (i.e., selfrestraint) of physicians to put the interests of their patients ahead of their own financial (or other)
interests.40 But the types of conflicts Professor Miller addresses—financial incentives for
enrolling patients in clinical studies and ownership interests in a product under
investigation—are neither unavoidable nor common to all physicians. Therefore, they are proper
subjects for regulation by conflict-of-interest doctrine. So, what would such doctrine provide?
Under conflict-of-interest doctrine in legal ethics, a conflict exists if there is substantial
risk that the representation of a client will be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer’s
own interests or by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third
person.41 Interests include not only financial interests, but also personal interests, such as
personal relationships (e.g., the opposing party is the lawyer’s spouse) or deeply held religious or
political beliefs.42 The mere presence of some conflicting interest is not sufficient to trigger
conflict-of-interest analysis; rather, an analysis is triggered only when the interest is of such a

39

See supra note [ ] & accompanying text. See also Arnold S. Relman, “Economic Incentives in Clnical
Investigation,” 320 N.Eng. J. Med. 933 (1989) (conceding that professional ambition in medical scientists creates
risk of bias, but arguing that it also has “a redeeming social value absent from the pursuit of economic self-interest”
and, in any event, “interest in professional advancement, unlike the pursuit of private gain, cannot be prevented by
legislation or any social action”).
40

See, e.g., Hazard, supra note [ ] (“self-control” as one of several techniques used to address conflicts of
interest facing professionals.)
41

American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 121 (1998). Conflict-ofinterest doctrine, including not only disciplinary rules, but also the law of disqualification and civil liability based on
breach of fiduciary duty, is restated in Chapter 8 of the new Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers. See
generally Nancy J. Moore, Restating the Law of Lawyer Conflicts,” 10 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 541 (1997) (hereinafter
“Lawyer Conflicts”) (reviewing the proposed final draft of entire chapter). For purposes of this article, the most
relevant provision of lawyer disciplinary codes is the rule generally addressed to concurrent conflicts of interest. See
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7(b) (“A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation
of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by
the lawyer’s own interests....”).
42

See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, supra note [41], § 125, cmt. c.

January 9, 2001

9

magnitude that it might materially impair the lawyer’s ability to consider alternative courses of
action, discuss all relevant aspects of the representation with the client, or otherwise represent
the client competently and diligently.43
Having identified a potentially disqualifying conflict, the lawyer must then determine
whether the representation may proceed with the adequately informed consent of the client or
whether the conflict is nonconsentable.44 Some conflicts are specifically prohibited, such as
preparing instruments giving the lawyer a substantial gift from an unrelated client45 or making an
agreement giving the lawyer media rights to information relating to an ongoing representation.46
More typically, however, particular conflicts are found to be nonconsentable when the lawyer
cannot reasonably conclude that the lawyer will be able to provide effective representation.47
Underlying any conclusion that a conflict is nonconsentable is the belief that a client who would
give consent in such a case is unlikely to have fully understood or appreciated the risks or has
not felt free to reject the representation.48
Applying this doctrine to the circumstances addressed by Professor Miller, I think it clear
43

Id.

44

See Moore, “Lawyer Conflicts,” supra note [ ] at 548-49 (describing the important steps an individual
lawyer should take in analyzing a potentially impermissible conflict of interest).
45

See ABA Model Rules, Rule 1.8(c).

46

See ABA Model Rules, Rule 1.8(d).

47

Under the disciplinary code, a conflict is nonconsentable unless “the lawyer reasonably believes the
representation will not be adversely affected.” ABA Model Rules, Rule 1.7(b)(1). See also Restatement (Third) of
the Law Governing Lawyers, § 122(2)(c) (notwithstanding informed consent of client, lawyer may not represent a
client if “in the circumstances, it is not reasonably likely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate
representation to one or more of the clients.
48

See Moore, “Lawyer Conflicts,” supra note [ ] at 557. For a defense of the paternalism underlying these
rules, see generally Nancy J. Moore, “Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Representation of Multiple Clients: A
Proposed Solution to the Current Confusion and Controversy,” 61 Tex. L. Rev. 211 (1982) (hereinafter “Conflicts of
Interest”).
January 9, 2001
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that most cases will involve conflicts of interest that, at a minimum, must be disclosed to the
patient. For example, unless the financial incentive is de minimus (and thus not much of an
“incentive”), surely there is substantial risk that physicians who receive payments for enrolling
their patients in clinical studies will be biased, either consciously or unconsciously, in favor of
recommending a patient’s participation. Such risk is also present when physicians have a
significant financial interest in the product under investigation. At the very least, patients of
these physicians are entitled to the information indicating possible bias; information that might
lead them to seek either a new physician or a second opinion before deciding to participate in a
clinical study.49
The more difficult question will be whether disclosure is sufficient or whether the
conflict should be deemed nonconsentable. At least one medical association has come out in
favor of an outright ban on physicians having ownership interests in companies whose products
they are testing.50 Nevertheless, it is anticipated that other physician and hospital associations
will oppose such a ban, on the ground that the risk of bias is “greatly outweighed by the
advantages to medical science and patients’ interests in allowing these physicians to continue to
have incentives to develop and test new devices.”51 This argument may be especially strong in

49

One philosopher suggests that disclosing conflicts of interest to patients is not an adequate remedy
because it does not resolve the conflict or solve the problem. See Erde, supra note [ ] at 28. He further believes that
the primary effect of disclosing conflicts would be “to be very distrustful and very assertive in largely implausible
ways.” Id. But his definition of conflicts is so broad as to include virtually every motivation that might tempt a
physician to put the physician’s own interests above the patient’s interests. See supra note [ ]. Given such a broad
definition of conflicts of interest, disclosure is clearly not a workable solution, as it would serve merely to undermine
the patient’s trust in the professionalism of the physician.
50

See Barnes and Krauss at p. 2 (noting that the American Society of Gene Therapy “adopted a policy that
its members engaged in gene therapy research should have no equity, stock options or other ownership interests in
the companies whose products they are testing in clinical trials”).
51

Id.
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the case of medical devices, given the difficulty of finding someone other than the physicianinventor who is willing to conduct the tests.52

But the potential benefit to society at large is

not necessarily a sufficient reason to permit such practices. After all, the risk is not to society at
large, but rather to individual patients. Using legal ethics as a guide, the more important
questions may be whether there are any potential benefits to the patients themselves and whether
their consent is likely to have been sufficiently informed and voluntary.53
Professor Miller strongly suggests that there are no benefits to the patient-subjects,
because clinical trials are experiments, not therapy.54 But patient-subjects may have a different
view. First, there is at least some possibility that some of them will be benefitted by the trial
itself.55 Second, even if it is unlikely that any individual trial will benefit a particular subject,
participation in these trials helps bring to market new drugs or devices, some of which may
provide a future benefit to these patients. Finally, the possibility of providing a future benefit to
other persons suffering from similar ailments may itself be a benefit to those asked to participate
in a clinical trial. Of course, the limited nature of these potential benefits must be understood, or
the consent will not have been sufficiently informed and voluntary. The concepts are not
complex, but there is some concern that aside from what is written in “informed consent

52

Cf. id. (“physician-researchers are often the primary inventors of new devices, co-own intellectual
property rights to those devices with their institutions, and are the primary clinical researches in regard to their own
devices”).
53
See Moore, Conflicts of Interest, supra note [ ] at 226 (waiver of some conflicts recognized because of
potential benefits of representation to client), 236-240 (justification for making some conflicts nonconsentable is
concern that consent is not truly informed and voluntary).
54

See Miller, “Trusting Doctors,” supra note 1, at [11-13]

55

See id. at [13] (“With hindsight a research subject’s health may indeed turn out to be improved by
participating in an experimental study, but the chances are statistically slim in most experimental protocols.”).
January 9, 2001
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documents,” financially-conflicted investigators may, consciously or unconsciously, distort the
information when talking to patients.56
Aside from the adequacy of the disclosure, there is concern that the dual role of
physician-investigators adversely impacts the voluntariness of patient consent.57 As the Office of
the Inspector General has noted, “[p]atients may be reluctant to contradict their doctor’s wishes
by refusing participation in a trial, or may agree to participate because they trust and respect their
physician, who they believe is looking out for their best interests.”58 But as Professor Miller
astutely observes, patients are not nearly as “trusting” as they once were.59 Moreover, once they
know that their physician has a financial interest in the product under investigation, they are
unlikely to have the same blind trust that they might have had in the absence of such
information.
Disclosure might be sufficient in the case of physicians with ownership interests in the
products under investigation. The argument is much stronger, however, for banning the payment
( or receipt) of financial incentives for enrolling patients in clinical studies. It is hard to even
imagine what the benefits might be of permitting such payments, either to society at large or to
patients themselves.60 Of course, physicians are entitled to be reimbursed for the actual costs of
56

See “Recruiting Human Subjects,” supra note [3] at 22. Cf. Fred C. Zacharias, “Waiving Conflicts of
Interest,” 108 Yale L. J. 407, 422 (1998) (speculating that code provisions providing for certain nonconsentable
conflicts might be explained by a distrust of the information and explanation given by lawyers with “a vested
economic interest in retaining their clients”).
57

See “Recruiting Human Subjects,” supra note [3] at 22.

58

Id. at 23.

59

See Miller, “Trusting Doctors,” supra note 1, at [8-10].

60

This lack of a benefit is most striking when an additional payment per subject enrolled is offered as the
enrollment deadline nears and additional subjects are still needed, in which case it seems obvious that the payments
are made solely to encourage speedy enrollments. See “Recruiting Human Subjects,” supra note [3] at 17.
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participating or conducting a clinical trial, and it may well be difficult to separate such costs
from “incentive” payments.61 On the other hand, if cost reimbursement payments are difficult to
distinguish from “incentive” payments, then it is unrealistic to expect patients to assess the
significance of the information disclosed, particularly if the information consists of either a
general statement that the physician is receiving an unspecified payment for each patient
enrolled or even a specification of the total per-patient dollar amount. This particular conflict is
no doubt best managed by simply preventing it altogether.62

Conclusion

I do not suggest how or even by whom63 these conflicts will be resolved. I do suggest,
however, that physicians are woefully ignorant of the importance of developing a workable
conflict-of-interest doctrine for medical practice. Such a doctrine would apply not only to the
clinical research issues addressed by Professor Miller, but also to conflicts issues that arise in
everyday clinical practice.64 These conflicts may not occur with the same frequency that they do

61

See id.

62

Cf. id. at 2 (discussing how various conflicting financial interests “must be managed, declined, disclosed
or altogether prevented”).
63

See Moore, “Doctors and Lawyers,” supra note ___ at 182-184 (discussing the greater role played by
legislative and administrative bodies in regulating physicians than in regulating lawyers).
64

For example, one medical ethicist discusses a case in which a physician learns that his patient, David, is a
homosexual. Five years later, he learns that his long-time patient Joan is engaged to marry David. The case is treated
as one involving “conflicting loyalties, a case where the physician must divulge confidential information about one
patient in order to benefit another patient.” McConnell, supra note [11] at 42-43. The author dismisses his own
analogy to lawyers’ conflict-of-interest doctrine by noting that “this sort of conflict cannot be anticipated by the
medical worker,” and then proceeds to resolve the conflict in favor of disclosure. Id. at 42-43. Of course,
unanticipated conflicts arise quite frequently in legal practice, and conflict-of-interest doctrine addresses this
problem, by requiring that the lawyer withdraw from representing both clients when informed consent is impossible,
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in legal practice; nevertheless, physicians must be prepared to deal with them in a manner
calculated to preserve the trust placed in them by their patients. Trusting physicians (and
lawyers, too) may be a tricky business, but it is the business of professionals to encourage and
nurture that trust or they may well find themselves bereft of their “professional” status.

as it would be in this case. See ABA Model Rules, Rule 1.7, Comment [2] (stating that when a conflict arises after
representation has been undertaken, the lawyer should withdraw from the representation) & Comment [5] (stating
that if one client refuses to consent to disclosure necessary to permit the other client to give an informed consent, the
lawyer may not request consent to the conflict).
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